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Some Reflections on Turtles, Tuna, Dolphin,
and Shrimp
David A. Wirth
The disputed United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle dispute)! marks the first time that the World
Trade Organization's (WTO) Appellate Body has opined on the unilateral
use of trade measures to protect resources outside a country's jurisdiction.
This is a highly controversial issue that has been of intense interest since at
least the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) United States-
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphin) panel report in 1991.2 As a
result of the somewhat anomalous situation in which the first Tuna-Dolphin
report was not presented by the complaining party to the GATT Council,
while a second report in essentially the same dispute' remained unadopted by
the Council at the time of the dissolution of the GATT and its replacement by
the WTO, observers of, and participants in, the multilateral trading system
have had a considerable period of time in which to reflect on the generic prob-
lem. This setting also makes for a fascinating case study in the evolution of
analytical tools for addressing this challenging issue.
I. UNILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES EMPLOYING TRADE
RESTRICTIONS
Comparing the panel reports in Tuna-Dolphin I, and Tuna-Dolphin II, and
Shrimp-Turtle, one cannot help but be struck by the disparate treatment of
similar issues by the different panels notwithstanding that the results in all
three instances were the same. The result in the first report turned in great
1 United States-Prohibition of Shrimps and Certain Shrimp Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/AB/R (98-000) (12 October 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report]; United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R
(15 May 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report]. The Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Appellate
Body Report and the Panel Report, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, on 6 November
1998.
2 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 39 GATT BISD 155 (1993), reprinted in
30 ILM 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin 1].
3 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 839
(1994) [hereineafter Tuna-Dolphin /1].
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measure on the extrajurisdictional location of the resource, the outcome in
the second on the use of trade measures to leverage the environmental poli-
cies of another contracting party, and the holding in the third on "threat]s] to
the multilateral trading system" as operative tests for distinguishing between
measures permitted by, or inconsistent with, the GATT. Taken together,
these three reports are persuasive evidence of a lack of consistency among the
panels, if not necessarily an argument for the rigidity of a system of stare deci-
sis.
The report of the Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case represents an
amalgam of perspectives found in some measure in the earlier panel reports,
but in a more nuanced form. The significant disparities in analytical approach
among the four reports, including the Appellate Body's report, also highlight
the extent to which the panels are genuinely in the business of making new law
in a relatively unfettered manner while purporting to resolve particular dis-
putes through the application of the WTO agreements, the texts of which do
not expressly address the generic problem. At the same time, a strict rule of
stare decisis or even a quest merely for a minimal level of consistency can be
a two-edged sword. The Appellate Body noted the need to interpret GATT
1947 "in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations
about the protection and conservation of the cnvironmcnt'v--ca perspective
described as "by definition, evolutionary."5 In comparison to the three prior
treatments of the generic issue by panels, the Appellate Body's identification
of the need to interpret WTO disciplines in light of evolving norms bodes well
for the effective inclusion of environment and other competing non-trade val-
ues in the WTO regime.
In comparison with the two Tuna-Dolphin reports and the Shrimp-Turtle
panel decision, the Appellate Body's analysis is noteworthy for its much more
subtle treatment of the general problem, which is presented in concrete terms
in the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle disputes. At least on the surface, the
Appellate Body also appeared appreciably more receptive to the environ-
mental policies that the challenged measures sought to promote. To that
extent, the Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case corrected overreaching
by not one, but three, panels. The Appellate Body did not cite the earlier
Tuna-Dolphin panel reports. In light of the uncertain status of those decisions
as authoritative interpretations of the GATT, the Appellate Body's treatment
of this dispute as a case of first impression was most desirable. It remains to
be seen whether the Appellate Body's report is the first definitive entry in an
ongoing discourse over this principled issue or whether it purports to be the
last word in the debate.
The Appellate Body relied, apparently for the first time, on the passage in
the first preambular paragraph of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
4 Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, at para. 129.
5 Id. at para. 109 (quoting International Court of Justice).
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World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)," which addresses sustainable
development and the environment. Noting that the preamble gives "colour,
texture and shading" to the substantive obligations in the WTO agreements,
the Appellate Body accordingly went on to interpret Article XX with an eye
not only to the benefits to international trade from the WTO regime of agree-
ments, but also a receptivity to the sometimes competing environmental con-
cerns motivating the challenged measure.
The Appellate Body, as it had prefigured in the United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline case (Reformulated Gasoline
case),? which was the Appellate Body's first ruling under the new WTO sys-
tem, suggested that there is a low threshold for application of the exception in
Article XX(g) that concerns the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources. This is an important signal, as GATT panels had earlier found a
need for rigorous scrutiny before accepting the availability of both this excep-
tion and the parallel one in Article XX(b), which concerns the protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health. In an almost offhand way, the
Appellate Body seems to have found that all migratory sea turtles fall within
the scope of Article XX(g), notwithstanding that only some species traverse
waters under the jurisdiction of the United States. Opining somewhat
obliquely that "in the specific circumstances of the case before us, there is a
sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine populations
involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g),"8 the Appellate
Body appears to have dispatched for all time the argument of the first Tuna-
Dolphin panel concerning the impermissible character of trade restrictions
intended to protect resources outside a state's jurisdiction.
The most salient feature of the report is very likely the space left by the
Appellate Body for future appropriate uses of trade-related measures of the
sort challenged in this dispute. As in its earlier report in the Reformulated
Gasoline controversy, the result in this dispute was determined by the appli-
cation of the chapeau to Article XX and, particularly, its tests of "unjustifi-
able" or "arbitrary" discrimination. Here, the Appellate Body emphasized
the application of the measure in the dispute at hand, thereby minimizing any
implication that the structure of the US program was inherently flawed. In
other words, the basis for the Appellate Body's holding was sufficiently nar-
row as to leave some prospects for states to employ similar measures to those
challenged in this case, so long as those requirements are appropriately
applied. Perhaps as important as what the Appellate Body said was what it
6 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, in Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations-The Legal Texts 404 (1994), reprinted
in 33 ILM 1125 (1994).
7 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT
DSS/AB/R (20 May 1996), reprinted in 35 ILM 603 (1996). See also <http://www.wto.org/wto/
dispute/distab.htm>.
8 Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, at para. 133.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/yielaw/article-abstract/9/1/40/1664791
by Boston College, O'Neill Library user
on 26 April 2018
TURTLES, TUNA, DOLPHIN, AND SHRIMP 43
did not say. Specifically, the Appellate Body did not reaffirm in toto the
reasoning of the panel in the Shrimp-Turtle case nor did it affirm either of the
previous Tuna-Dolphin panels, all of which concluded that the unilateral mea-
sures challenged in those cases were inevitably defective because of their
inherent structure.
The result in this case consequently turned on a variety of attributes, which
were perhaps unique to this dispute, that the Appellate Body considered to be
arbitrary or unjustifiable or both. In the first place, the US program required
other states to adopt essentially the same regulatory program employing tur-
tle excluder devices (TEDs), regardless of the other state's particular circum-
stances or the appropriateness of different strategies to achieve the goal of
turtle conservation. Second, as an arbitrary or unjustifiable artifact of the US
regulatory scheme, in certain cases, shrimp were excluded from the US mar-
ket solely because they were caught in the waters of states that did not have a
comparable program to that of the United States, even if the product had
been harvested with the use of TEDs. Third, as a result of court orders in the
extensive litigation on these issues that was occuring domestically within the
United States, certain exporting states had more advance notice of, and a
longer "phase-in" period to prepare for, the TEDs requirement than had the
complaining parties. Fourth, the United States engaged in disparate treat-
ment of various exporting countries in transferring the TEDs technology
overseas. Fifth, the Appellate Body criticized the absence of transparency and
of "basic fairness and due process"? in the manner in which the United States
unilaterally processes applications for the certification of foreign programs
under the domestic statutory scheme.
In contrast to the two Tuna-Dolphin panels and the earlier Shrimp-Turtle
panel, the Appellate Body's report in the present case does not conclude that
measures such as those challenged in this dispute are categorically unaccept-
able. Rather, each of the five objections noted earlier could be cured through
appropriate modifications to the US program. As an apparently independent
basis for the result in the dispute, the Appellate Body additionally cited the
failure of the United States to engage other states, including the complaining
parties, in negotiations with the goal of a bilaterally- or multilaterally-agreed
strategy for turtle conservation. In several passages, the Appellate Body
pointed out that such overtures ought to have occurred before unilateral
trade restrictions were imposed. While this defect, in contrast to the others
identified by the Appellate Body, would be difficult to cure retroactively, the
Appellate Body's report nevertheless suggests that a future case in which this
admonition had been heeded might survive scrutiny. Most importantly, the
Appellate Body report anticipates that states such as the United States at
least under some circumstances could employ unilateral measures of the sort
9 Id. at para. 181.
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challenged in this dispute as walkaway or failsafe options even if negotiations
are undertaken. This implicit but strongly suggested result preserves the prin-
cipal value of such import restrictions as incentive-creating, leadership tools
that discourage what is often a least-common-denominator, downward drag
diluting the rigor of internationally agreed measures in multilateral negotia-
tions.
II. THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The posture of this dispute also demonstrates the need for greater policy and
technical attention to the role of science in trade agreement dispute settlement
processes. On its own motion, the panel responded to the scientific and tech-
nical questions raised by the dispute by deciding to seek scientific advice.
After requesting nominations from the parties, the panel chose five experts
who were consulted individually in their personal capacities. After again con-
sulting with the parties, the panel then submitted written questions to these
experts, who subsequently attended a meeting with the panel and the parties
to discuss their written responses and to provide additional information.
The Shrimp-Turtle panel consulted the independent scientists for their
opinions on the migratory patterns of sea turtles, the presence of the animals
in particular waters, the relationship between turtles and shrimping opera-
tions, the efficacy of TEDs under a variety of conditions, and the availability
and effectiveness of conservation measures other than TEDs. Nonetheless,
the extensive scientific evaluation undertaken by the panel had little, if any,
operative significance for the report. Since the panel's inquiry had started and
ended with the chapeau of Article XX, there was no need to examine most of
the scientific questions addressed to the experts. In any event, the panel's sci-
entific review presumably provided the factual basis for the Appellate Body's
finding that Article XX(g) was available to the responding party in this case.
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) anticipates the formation by the panels of
"expert review groups" to resolve "factual issue[s] concerning a scientific or
other technical matter."!" According to the DSU, an expert review group pre-
pares a draft report, which is to be made available to the parties to the dispute
for comment, and a final version, which is transmitted to the panel and "shall
be advisory only."11Although the DSU does not say so explicitly, the expec-
tation seems to be that such a report would reflect the consensus view of the
expert review group as a whole.
10 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April
1994, art. 19, para. 1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, in Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations-The Legal Texts 404
(1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1226 (1994).
11 Id. at App. 4, para. 6.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/yielaw/article-abstract/9/1/40/1664791
by Boston College, O'Neill Library user
on 26 April 2018
TURTLES, TUNA, DOLPHIN, AND SHRIMP 45
A procedure for securing scientific expertise from several independent
experts, similar to that employed in the Shrimp-Turtle case, was utilized by
the panel in the earlier ECMeasures Concerning Meat and Meat Products dis-
pute (BeefHormones dispute). The Appellate Body's report in that dispute'?
approved the process used in that case with scant analysis. The Measures
Affecting the Importation of Salmon dispute, which involved restrictions on
the importation of salmon into Australia to prevent disease;" and another
case in which Japan's practice of variety-by-variety testing of imported fruit
for the effectiveness of quarantine treatment!" utilized the basic model crafted
in the BeefHormones dispute, which suggests that this pattern of consultation
with a multiplicity of independent experts and subsequent synthesis of those
scientific views by the panel has become something of a standard practice by
panels.
This strategy has the advantage of ensuring that the panel has access to a
range of perspectives and that the process of scientific consultation is rela-
tively transparent. These procedures, however, leave the resolution of diver-
gences in the scientists' responses and of disputed questions of scientific
"fact" in the hands of the members of the panel and not in those of the scien-
tists themselves or the scientific community. Since scientific questions were
largely peripheral to the analytical inquiry required of the panel and the
Appellate Body, this consideration was probably of little importance in the
Shrimp-Turtle dispute. This attribute can, however, be expected to be rather
more important in other cases, such as the BeefHormones dispute, whose out-
comes turn more directly on tests of scientific validity.
Although the DSU may not have precluded alternative means of consulta-
tion on scientific matters, as the Appellate Body found in the BeefHormones
dispute, a technique employing multiple individual responses has now been
employed by panels in at least four disputes. At the same time, an expert
review group has not been created in a single one. That is not to say that an
expert review group is superior to the procedures actually employed by these
recent panels or that the drafters of the DSU intended expert groups to be the
sole vehicle for consultation between panels and scientists. Nonetheless, this
arguable departure from the intent of the drafters of the DSU, whether a salu-
tary development or not, highlights the need for an entity that is qualified to
12 European Community-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R (16 January 1998). See also <http://www.wto.org/wto/dis-
pute/distab.htm>.
13 Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Panel Report, WTO Doc.
WT/DS/18R (12 June 1998), see also <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>;
Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc.
WT/DSI8/AB/R (20 October 1998), see also <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>.
14 Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS/76/R
(27 October 1998), see also <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>; Japan-Measures
Affecting Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R (22
February 1999), see also <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>.
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address this question to undertake a further inquiry into the appropriate
treatment of scientific evidence in the quasi-adjudicatory, adversarial setting
of a trade agreement dispute settlement panel. This might well be an appro-
priate issue for a subsequent thorough examination by an independent group
of scholars, scientists, and other individuals who have relevant expertise,
convened under the auspices of the WTO's Committee on Trade and
Environment.
III. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The question of public participation in trade agreement dispute settlement
processes has attracted a great deal of attention in the earlier Tuna-Dolphin
disputes as well as in later cases. In an apparent attempt to force the issue as
a test case, several non-governmental organizations made submissions as
amicus curiae directly to the panel. Concluding that it had no authority under
the DSU to consider such submissions, the panel rejected them. The United
States then appended similar statements from some of the same organizations
to its submission to the panel, which the panel was prepared to accept, and
adopted a similar approach in transmitting appended non-governmental sub-
missions to the Appellate Body in the case.
The Appellate Body reversed the panel, concluding that it had erred in find-
ing that it was without authority to accept the non-governmental submis-
sions. The Appellate Body did not, however, hold that the panel was obliged
to accept the submissions. The result is something of a halfway measure that
clearly leaves considerable discretion to panels without, so far as can be deter-
mined, much in the way of oversight by the Appellate Body for abuse by pan-
els of that discretion. On the one hand, this development represents some
progress in improving and regularizing the transparency of, and direct access
to, WTO dispute settlement processes on the part of non-state actors. Had the
Appellate Body concluded otherwise, non-governmental statements could
still be appended to the submissions of states as disputing parties. However,
it does not require much ingenuity to imagine a situation in which the litiga-
tion posture of a government and the interests of certain of its domestic con-
stituencies are in opposition and not in harmony, as was the case in the
Shrimp-Turtle dispute. In such a situation, those interests would have no
voice, at least in a formal manner, which would result in a process that is nei-
ther predictable in its operation nor neutral with respect to outcome.
On the other hand, the opening presented by the Appellate Body may
prove to be either illusory in practice or sufficiently variable in application
that it is not predictable. The practical fallback alternative will then likely be
the current system, similarly uncertain, in which state parties to the dispute
may, but need not, append non-governmental analyses from private parties
within their jurisdiction to the state's own submission. It would seem, at an
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absolute minimum, to be desirable for the Appellate Body to utilize an appro-
priately framed subsequent appeal as an occasion for articulating general
standards for panels to apply in accepting or rejecting non-governmental sub-
missions. It will be interesting to see whether, in the absence of further "leg-
islative" instructions from the WTO members, the Appellate Body will
consider the issue of public participation to be resolved for all time or whether
the Appellate Body will be prepared to encourage still further progress on this
question.
The Appellate Body's report in the Shrimp-Turtle case is an important
milestone in each of these important areas-the deployment of unilateral
trade-related measures, the role of science in WTO dispute settlement, and
public participation in panel processes. With respect to each of these issues,
however, substantial questions remain. Consequently, the Appellate Body's
report is likely to represent an interim juncture, as opposed to the last word,
on these important elements of the trade-and-environment debate.
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